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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 In 1991 George Holliday recorded video of the Los 
Angeles Police Department officers beating Rodney King and 
submitted it to the local news.  Filming police on the job was 
rare then but common now.  With advances in technology and 
the widespread ownership of smartphones, “civilian recording 
of police officers is ubiquitous.”  Jocelyn Simonson, 
Copwatching, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 391, 408 (2016); see Seth F. 
Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: 
Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 335, 337 (2011).  These recordings have both exposed 
police misconduct and exonerated officers from errant 
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charges.  However, despite the growing frequency of private 
citizens recording police activity and its importance to all 
involved, some jurisdictions have attempted to regulate the 
extent of this practice.  Individuals making recordings have 
also faced retaliation by officers, such as arrests on false 
criminal charges and even violence.   
 This case involves retaliation.  Richard Fields and 
Amanda Geraci attempted to record Philadelphia police 
officers carrying out official duties in public and were 
retaliated against even though the Philadelphia Police 
Department’s official policies recognized that “[p]rivate 
individuals have a First Amendment right to observe and 
record police officers engaged in the public discharge of their 
duties.”  J.A. 1187.  No party contested the existence of the 
First Amendment right.  Yet the District Court concluded that 
neither Plaintiff had engaged in First Amendment activity 
because the conduct—the act of recording—was not 
sufficiently expressive.  However, this case is not about 
whether Plaintiffs expressed themselves through conduct.  It 
is whether they have a First Amendment right of access to 
information about how our public servants operate in public.   
 Every Circuit Court of Appeals to address this issue 
(First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh) has held that there 
is a First Amendment right to record police activity in public.  
See Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 
2017); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014); Am. Civil 
Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 
2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. 
City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. 
City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).  Today we join 
this growing consensus.  Simply put, the First Amendment 
protects the act of photographing, filming, or otherwise 
recording police officers conducting their official duties in 
public. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 In September 2012, Amanda Geraci, a member of the 
police watchdog group “Up Against the Law,” attended an 
anti-fracking protest at the Philadelphia Convention Center.  
She carried her camera and wore a pink bandana that 
identified her as a legal observer.  About a half hour into the 
protest, the police acted to arrest a protestor.  Geraci moved to 
a better vantage point to record the arrest and did so without 
interfering with the police.  An officer abruptly pushed Geraci 
and pinned her against a pillar for one to three minutes, which 
prevented her from observing or recording the arrest.  Geraci 
was not arrested or cited. 
 One evening in September 2013, Richard Fields, a 
sophomore at Temple University, was on a public sidewalk 
where he observed a number of police officers breaking up a 
house party across the street.  The nearest officer was 15 feet 
away from him.  Using his iPhone, he took a photograph of 
the scene.  An officer noticed Fields taking the photo and 
asked him whether he “like[d] taking pictures of grown men” 
and ordered him to leave.   J.A. 8.  Fields refused, so the 
officer arrested him, confiscated his phone, and detained him.  
The officer searched Fields’ phone and opened several videos 
and other photos.  The officer then released Fields and issued 
him a citation for “Obstructing Highway and Other Public 
Passages.”  These charges were withdrawn when the officer 
did not appear at the court hearing.   
 Fields and Geraci brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims 
against the City of Philadelphia and certain police officers.  
They alleged that the officers illegally retaliated against them 
for exercising their First Amendment right to record public 
police activity and violated their Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from an unreasonable search or seizure.    
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 They also pointed out that the City’s Police 
Department’s official policies recognized their First 
Amendment right.  In 2011 the Department published a 
memorandum advising officers not to interfere with a private 
citizen’s recording of police activity because it was protected 
by the First Amendment.  In 2012 it published an official 
directive reiterating that this right existed.  Both the 
memorandum and directive were read to police officers 
during roll call for three straight days.  And in 2014, after the 
events in our case and the occurrence of other similar 
incidents, the Department instituted a formal training program 
to ensure that officers ceased retaliating against bystanders 
who recorded their activities.   
 The District Court nonetheless granted summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on the First Amendment 
claims.  They did not argue against the existence of a First 
Amendment right, but rather contended that the individual 
officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that the City 
could not be vicariously liable for the officers’ acts.  Yet the 
District Court on its own decided that Plaintiffs’ activities 
were not protected by the First Amendment because they 
presented no evidence that their “conduct may be construed 
as expression of a belief or criticism of police activity.”  
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 537 (E.D. 
Pa. 2016).  When confronted by the police, Plaintiffs did not 
express their reasons for recording.  Their later deposition 
testimony showed that Geraci simply wanted to observe and 
Fields wanted to take a picture of an “interesting” and “cool” 
scene.  Id. at 539.  In addition, neither testified of having an 
intent to share his or her photos or videos.  Id.   The District 
Court thus concluded that, “[a]bsent any authority from the 
Supreme Court or our Court of Appeals, we decline to create 
a new First Amendment right for citizens to photograph 
officers when they have no expressive purpose such as 
challenging police actions.” Id. at 542.   
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 Because of this ruling, the District Court did not reach 
the issues of qualified immunity or municipal liability.  
However, it allowed the Fourth Amendment claims to go to 
trial.  Id.  (“The citizens are not without remedy because once 
the police officer takes your phone, alters your technology, 
arrests you or applies excessive force, we proceed to trial on 
the Fourth Amendment claims.”).  By stipulation, Plaintiffs 
dismissed their Fourth Amendment claims so that they could 
immediately appeal the First Amendment ruling.     
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
these federal civil rights claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 
1343, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 
F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010).  It “is appropriate only where, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Id. (alteration in original and citation omitted).  Because this 
is a First Amendment case, we must also “engage in a 
searching, independent factual review of the full record.”  
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 186 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).   
III. ORDER OF ANALYSIS 
 Defendants ask us to avoid ruling on the First 
Amendment issue.  Instead, they want us to hold that, 
regardless of the right’s existence, the officers are entitled to 
qualified immunity and the City cannot be vicariously liable 
for the officers’ acts.  We reject this invitation to take the easy 
way out.  Because this First Amendment issue is of great 
importance and the recording of police activity is a 
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widespread, common practice, we deal with it before 
addressing, if needed, defenses to liability.   
 In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that courts 
must determine whether a constitutional right existed before 
deciding if it had been “clearly established” such that 
defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity.  533 
U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001).  Less than a decade later, however, 
the Court reversed course in Pearson v. Callahan, holding 
that courts instead have the discretion to choose to address 
immunity first and bypass the substantive constitutional issue.  
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  We have not ruled on the First 
Amendment right, instead merely holding that at the time of 
our rulings the claimed right was not clearly established.  
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010); 
True Blue Auctions v. Foster, 528 F. App’x 190 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 In the years since, First Amendment issues from the 
recording of police activity recur, and they deal directly with 
constitutional doctrine.  With technological progress and the 
ubiquity of smartphone ownership—especially in the years 
since our Kelly decision—we are now in an age where the 
public can record our public officials’ conduct and easily 
distribute that recording widely.  This increase in the 
observation, recording, and sharing of police activity has 
contributed greatly to our national discussion of proper 
policing.  Consequently, police departments nationwide, often 
with input from the U.S. Department of Justice, are 
developing polices addressing precisely these issues, and our 
opinion can assist in their efforts to comply with the 
Constitution.  Moreover, in the case before us the 
constitutional question is not “so factbound that [our] 
decision [will] provide[] little guidance for future cases.”  
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237.  All we need to decide is whether 
the First Amendment protects the act of recording police 
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officers carrying out official duties in public places.  We also 
have excellent briefing on appeal, including counsel for the 
parties and eight amici, including the U.S. Department of 
Justice, the Cato Institute, well-known First Amendment law 
professors, and some of the largest news organizations in the 
country.  We therefore address the First Amendment question 
before moving to the defenses.   
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD 
 The District Court concluded that Plaintiffs engaged in 
conduct only (the act of making a recording) as opposed to 
expressive conduct (using the recording to criticize the police 
or otherwise comment on officers’ actions).  It did so by 
analogy, applying the “expressive conduct” test used to 
address symbolic speech: “Conduct is protected by the First 
Amendment when the nature of the activity, combined with 
the factual context and environment in which it was 
undertaken, shows that the activity was sufficiently imbued 
with elements of communication to fall within the First 
Amendment’s scope.”  Fields, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 534 & n.34 
(quoting Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 
F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2002)).   
 We disagree on various fronts.  Foremost is that the 
District Court focused on whether Plaintiffs had an expressive 
intent, such as a desire to disseminate the recordings, or to use 
them to criticize the police, at the moment when they recorded 
or attempted to record police activity.  See id. at 534-35.  This 
reasoning ignores that the value of the recordings may not be 
immediately obvious, and only after review of them does 
their worth become apparent.  The First Amendment protects 
actual photos, videos, and recordings, see Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011), and for this 
protection to have meaning the Amendment must also protect 
the act of creating that material.  There is no practical 
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difference between allowing police to prevent people from 
taking recordings and actually banning the possession or 
distribution of them.  See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596 
(“Restricting the use of an audio or audiovisual recording 
device suppresses speech just as effectively as restricting the 
dissemination of the resulting recording.”); see also Cato 
Institute Amicus Br. 7 (“[B]oth precedent and first principles 
demonstrate that the First Amendment protects the process of 
capturing inputs that may yield expression, not just the final 
act of expression itself”); Kreimer, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 366 
(“[T]he threat of arrest remains a potent deterrent to 
spontaneous photographers who have no deep commitment to 
capturing any particular image.”).  As illustrated here, 
because the officers stopped Ms. Geraci from recording the 
arrest of the protestor, she never had the opportunity to decide 
to put any recording to expressive use.         
 Plaintiffs and some amici argue that the act of 
recording is “inherently expressive conduct,” like painting, 
writing a diary, dancing, or marching in a parade.  See, e.g., 
First Amendment Law Professors Amicus Br. 8 (“If writing in 
an undistributed diary is speech, making an undistributed 
recording can be characterized as speech as well.”); Society 
for Photographic Education Amicus Br. 2 (“Making a 
photograph merits First Amendment protection because it is 
artistic expression just the same as painting a landscape, 
sketching a street scene, or sculpting a statue.”); Tenafly Eruv 
Ass’n, 309 F.3d at 160 (“‘Parades are thus a form of 
expression, not just motion . . . .’”) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 
557, 568 (1995)).  Regardless of the merits of these 
arguments, our case is not about people attempting to create 
art with police as their subjects.  It is about recording police 
officers performing their official duties.   
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 The First Amendment protects the public’s right of 
access to information about their officials’ public activities.  
It “goes beyond protection of the press and the self-
expression of individuals to prohibit government from 
limiting the stock of information from which members of the 
public may draw.”  First Nat’l. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 783 (1978).  Access to information regarding public 
police activity is particularly important because it leads to 
citizen discourse on public issues, “the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to 
special protection.”  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 
(2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)); 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (recognizing 
the “paramount public interest in a free flow of information to 
the people concerning public officials, their servants”).  That 
information is the wellspring of our debates; if the latter are to 
be “‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’” Snyder, 562 U.S. 
at 452 (quoting N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964)), the more credible the information the more credible 
are the debates.   
 To record what there is the right for the eye to see or 
the ear to hear corroborates or lays aside subjective 
impressions for objective facts.  Hence to record is to see and 
hear more accurately.  Recordings also facilitate discussion 
because of the ease in which they can be widely distributed 
via different forms of media.  Accordingly, recording police 
activity in public falls squarely within the First Amendment 
right of access to information.  As no doubt the press has this 
right, so does the public.  See PG Publ’g. Co. v. Aichele, 705 
F.3d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 2013); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665, 684 (1972).   
 Bystander videos provide different perspectives than 
police and dashboard cameras, portraying circumstances and 
surroundings that police videos often do not capture.  Civilian 
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video also fills the gaps created when police choose not to 
record video or withhold their footage from the public.  See 
Nat’l Police Accountability Project Amicus Br. 7 (noting that 
“[a] recent survey of 50 major police departments’ policies on 
body cameras revealed that many policies either failed to 
make clear when officers must turn on their body cameras, 
gave officers too much discretion when to record, or failed to 
require explanations when officers did not record”) (citation 
omitted).     
 The public’s creation of this content also complements 
the role of the news media.  Indeed, citizens’ gathering and 
disseminating “newsworthy information [occur] with an ease 
that rivals that of the traditional news media.”  2012 U.S. 
D.O.J. Letter to Baltimore Police Department; J.A. 1684.  See 
also Glik, 655 F.3d at 78 (“The proliferation of electronic 
devices with video-recording capability means that many of 
our images of current events come from bystanders with a 
ready cell phone or digital camera rather than a traditional 
film crew, and news stories are now just as likely to be 
broken by a blogger at her computer as a reporter at a major 
newspaper.”).  In addition to complementing the role of the 
traditional press, private recordings have improved 
professional reporting, as “video content generated by 
witnesses and bystanders has become a common component 
of news programming.”  The Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press and 31 Media Organizations Amicus Br. 
11; see also id. at 2 (“Today, the first source of information 
from the scene of a newsworthy event is frequently an 
ordinary citizen with a smart phone.”).  And the inclusion of 
“bystander video enriches the stories journalists tell, routinely 
adding a distinct, first-person perspective to news coverage.”  
Id. at 12.   
 Moreover, the proliferation of bystander videos has 
“spurred action at all levels of government to address police 
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misconduct and to protect civil rights.”  See Nat’l Police 
Accountability Proj. Amicus Br. 1.  These videos have helped 
police departments identify and discipline problem officers. 
They have also assisted civil rights investigations and aided in 
the Department of Justice’s work with local police 
departments. And just the act of recording, regardless what is 
recorded, may improve policing.  See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82-83.  
Important to police is that these recordings help them carry 
out their work.  They, every bit as much as we, are concerned 
with gathering facts that support further investigation or 
confirm a dead-end.  And of particular personal concern to 
police is that bystander recordings can “exonerate an officer 
charged with wrongdoing.” Turner, 848 F.3d at 689.    
 We do not say that all recording is protected or 
desirable.  The right to record police is not absolute.  “[I]t is 
subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.”  
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262; see Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of 
W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 1999).  But in 
public places these restrictions are restrained.     
 We need not, however, address at length the limits of 
this constitutional right.  Defendants offer nothing to justify 
their actions.  Fields took a photograph across the street from 
where the police were breaking up a party.  Geraci moved to a 
vantage point where she could record a protestor’s arrest, but 
did so without getting in the officers’ way.  If a person’s 
recording interferes with police activity, that activity might 
not be protected.  For instance, recording a police 
conversation with a confidential informant may interfere with 
an investigation and put a life at stake.  But here there are no 
countervailing concerns.   
 In sum, under the First Amendment’s right of access to 
information the public has the commensurate right to 
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record—photograph, film, or audio record—police officers 
conducting official police activity in public areas.  
V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
 Having decided the existence of this First Amendment 
right, we now turn to whether the officers are entitled to 
qualified immunity.  We conclude they are.  
 Government actors are entitled to qualified immunity 
unless they violated a constitutional right “so clearly 
established that ‘every reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”  Zaloga 
v. Borough of Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 659 (2012)) 
(emphasis in original).   “In other words, existing precedent 
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question 
beyond debate.”  Id. (quoting Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664) 
(emphasis in original).  We do not need Supreme Court 
precedent or binding Third Circuit precedent to guide us if 
there is a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority 
in the Courts of Appeals.”  L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 
F.3d 235, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration and citations 
omitted).  District court decisions, though not binding, also 
“play a role in the qualified immunity analysis.”  Doe v. 
Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 321 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001).  To determine 
whether the right is clearly established, we look at the state of 
the law when the retaliation occurred, here in 2012 (Geraci) 
and 2013 (Fields).  See id.    
 To conduct the clearly established inquiry, we “frame 
the right ‘in light of the specific context of the case, not as a 
broad general proposition,’” L.R., 836 F.3d at 247–48 
(citation omitted), as it needs to be “specific enough to put 
‘every reasonable official’ on notice of it.”  Zaloga, 841 F.3d 
at 175 (citation omitted).  At issue here is Plaintiffs’ ability to 
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record the police carrying out official duties in public.  We 
have never held that such a right exists, only that it might.  
See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“[V]ideotaping or photographing the police in the 
performance of their duties on public property may be a 
protected activity.”).  In 2010 we held that there was no 
clearly established right for the public to do so, at least in the 
context of a police traffic stop.  Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262 (“We 
find these cases insufficiently analogous to the facts of this 
case to have put Officer Rogers on notice of a clearly 
established right to videotape police officers during a traffic 
stop [in 2007].”).  Only a few years later in 2013, in a non-
precedential opinion, we held that “[e]ven if the distinction 
between traffic stops and public sidewalk confrontations is [ ] 
meaningful . . . [,] our case law does not clearly establish a 
right to videotape police officers performing their duties [in 
2009].”  True Blue Auctions, 528 F. App’x at 192-93.  So to 
resolve whether the right has become clearly established after 
these decisions, we must decide whether a “robust consensus” 
has emerged that puts the existence of this First Amendment 
right “beyond debate.” Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 175.     
 Plaintiffs contend the absence of Circuit precedent 
does not end the inquiry, as after the events in Kelly and True 
Blue the Philadelphia Police Department adopted official 
policies recognizing the First Amendment right of citizens to 
record police in public.  As plausible as that may be on the 
surface, it does not win the argument.  With one breath 
Plaintiffs assert that these policies clearly established their 
legal right, but for purposes of municipal liability (an issue 
we remand) they vigorously argue that the policies were 
utterly ineffective in conveying to the officers that this right 
clearly existed.  And Plaintiffs have compiled evidence 
indicating this was so.  For example, they point out that 
Captain Francis Healy, the policy advisor to the Police 
Commissioner, testified that, notwithstanding the adoption of 
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the Department’s policies, the “officers didn’t understand that 
there was a constitutional right [to record].”  Reply Br. 11 
(quoting J.A. 282-83).     
 As to decisions of other appellate courts relevant to the 
qualified immunity analysis, Defendants and the District 
Court argue that those decisions are distinguishable because 
they involved expressive intent or an intent to distribute.  See, 
e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588 (“The ACLU intends to publish 
these recordings online and through other forms of electronic 
media.”); Fields, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 538 n.56 (“In Glik, the 
plaintiff expressed concern police were using excessive force 
arresting a young man in a public park and began recording 
the arrest on his cell phone[,] and the police then arrested 
plaintiff. . . . Notably, the plaintiff in Fordyce [v. City of 
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995)] claimed he was 
recording a public protect for a local news station.”); see also 
D.O.J. Amicus Br. 22 n.14 (“[I]n those cases, the plaintiffs’ 
objectives or opinions . . . [to disseminate] were apparent 
from context.  In this respect, Fields’s case in particular is one 
of first impression.”).  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit just this year 
recognized that these other appellate decisions did not clearly 
establish the constitutional right to record.  See Turner, 848 
F.3d at 687.   
 Where District Courts in our Circuit have held in favor 
of the First Amendment right, Defendants also distinguish 
those cases for requiring expressive act or intent, not just 
recording alone, once again echoing the reasoning of the 
District Court here.  See Fields, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 537 (“We 
find the citizens videotaping and picture-taking in [those 
district court cases] all contained some element of expressive 
conduct or criticism of police officers and are patently 
distinguishable from Fields’ and Geraci’s activities.”).  
Whether Defendants and the District Court correctly 
distinguished these cases, we cannot say that the state of the 
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law at the time of our cases (2012 and 2013) gave fair 
warning so that every reasonable officer knew that, absent 
some sort of expressive intent, recording public police 
activity was constitutionally protected.  Accordingly, the 
officers are entitled to qualified immunity. 
VI. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY 
 Because of its First Amendment ruling, the District 
Court did not reach whether the City could be held liable for 
its officers’ conduct.  See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  While the City contends that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and it cannot be held 
liable as a matter of law, we follow our usual practice of 
according our District Court colleague the initial opportunity 
to resolve these contentions.     
* * * * * 
 We ask much of our police.  They can be our shelter 
from the storm.  Yet officers are public officials carrying out 
public functions, and the First Amendment requires them to 
bear bystanders recording their actions.  This is vital to 
promote the access that fosters free discussion of 
governmental actions, especially when that discussion 
benefits not only citizens but the officers themselves.  We 
thus reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
 
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 16-1650; Geraci v. City 
Philadelphia, No. 16-1651 
 
Nygaard, J., concurring in the part, dissenting in part.   
 
 I agree with the majority that the cause must be 
remanded.  Because I conclude that the First Amendment 
right at issue is and was clearly established, I dissent. 
 
 The question of whether a constitutional right is 
clearly established has to be considered in a real-world 
context; this is why our analysis is conducted from the 
perspective of a “reasonable official.”  L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration and 
citations omitted).  Such an approach protects public 
officials—particularly our police officers in the field—from 
uncertainty about the precise boundary of a particular 
constitutional right when situations arise that have not yet 
been considered by the courts.  Nonetheless, we must apply 
this “reasonable official” analysis consistently, recognizing 
that there are instances—rare though they may be—when any 
reasonable official in the circumstance would know the 
boundaries of a constitutional right well before we have ruled 
on it.  I am confident that this is one of those cases because of 
the unique combination of a number of factors. 
 
 First, as the majority notes, every Circuit Court of 
Appeals that has considered the issue ruled that there is a First 
Amendment right to record police activity in public.  Four of 
these decisions were published before the conduct at issue 
here, and two of them occurred after our decision in Kelly v. 
Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010), in which 
we posited that the right was not clearly established at that 
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time.  See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 
F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st 
Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th 
Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 
1995).1  I am convinced that such a “robust consensus,” 
alone, sufficiently grounds a ruling that the right is clearly 
established.  L.R., 836 F.3d at 247–48.  However, our record 
goes far beyond that. 
 
 The Police Department’s official policies explicitly 
recognized this First Amendment right well before the 
incidents under review here took place.  Captain Frank Healy 
of the Department’s Research and Planning Unit stated that, 
in 2011, officers did “not understand the police [were] 
allowed to be taped in public.” App. 119 (2013 Healy dep. at 
54).  Because there was “some confusion on the street” he 
testified that there “was a definite need for the policy.” App. 
121 (2013 Healy dep. at 62).  He said that the Department 
wanted “to be on the forefront rather than on the back end,” 
of educating its officers on this issue, prompting Police 
Commissioner Charles Ramsey to request that a policy be 
written requiring police officers to “allow citizens to record 
the police.”  App. 118 (2013 Healy dep. at 52).  The policy 
was intended to get “clarification out on the street so the 
officers knew what their duties [were].”  App. 120 (2013 
Healy dep. at 59).  It issued a memorandum in September, 
2011 stating that police should reasonably expect to be 
photographed, videotaped and or audibly recorded by 
members of the general public.  Commissioner’s 
                                              
1 Two more recent decisions reinforce the trend.  See Turner 
v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017); Gericke v. 
Begin, 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014).   
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Memorandum 11-01, issued on September 23, 2011, made 
clear to all Philadelphia police officers that they “shall not” 
obstruct or prevent this conduct, and that “under no 
circumstances” were permitted to disable or damage the 
devices being used.  App. 1185. 
 
 In the year that followed publication of the 
memorandum, Internal Affairs received eight complaints by 
citizens of retaliation by police for recording police 
performing their duties.  App. 1569.  Additionally, the U.S. 
Department of Justice issued recommendations in May, 2012, 
that all police departments “affirmatively set forth the First 
Amendment right to record police activity.”  App. 1675.  As a 
result, the Commissioner directed Captain Healy and his unit 
to revise the Memorandum to incorporate the Department of 
Justice recommendations.  The revised document was issued 
as Departmental Directive 145 on November 9, 2012.  Like a 
Memorandum, a Directive is also official Departmental 
policy, but it covers a topic in greater depth.  
 
 Directive 145 plainly requires officers to allow citizens 
to make recordings of police activity.  The Directive uses, 
verbatim, the language of the Department of Justice’s 
recommendation, stating that its purpose was to “protect the 
constitutional rights of individuals to record police officers 
engaged in the public discharge of their duties.”  App. 1187.  
It said, further, that “observing, gathering, and disseminating 
of information . . . is a form of free speech.”  Id.  Police 
officers were prohibited from “blocking, obstructing, or 
otherwise hindering” recordings made by persons “unless the 
person making such recording engages in actions that 
jeopardize the safety of the officer, any suspects or other 
individuals in the immediate vicinity, violate the law, incite 
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others to violate, or actually obstruct an officer from 
performing any official duty.”  Id.  As it was published, the 
Department mandated that a sergeant read it at every roll call, 
Department-wide.  Each police officer also received a copy of 
the Directive and was required to sign that they received it. 
 
 Although the Directives declared a First Amendment 
right well ahead of this Court, the Philadelphia Police 
Department Commissioner had a desire to “get out ahead” of 
what he presciently viewed as an inevitable ruling.  With all 
of this, it is indisputable that all officers in the Philadelphia 
Police Department were put on actual notice that they were 
required to uphold the First Amendment right to make 
recordings of police activity.  From a practical perspective, 
the police officers had no ground to claim ambiguity about 
the boundaries of the citizens’ constitutional right here.  
Mindful of the established trend among the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, this combined with this clear Guidance from the 
Commissioner sufficiently grounds a conclusion that the right 
to record official, public police activity was clearly 
established and “beyond debate.”  Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 175 
(quoting Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2093).  However, this, too, 
ignores another piece of the context of this case that should be 
considered as part of the “reasonable official” inquiry. 
 
 The majority cites to the 2011 article of Seth F. 
Kreimer,2 in which he notes that, given the ubiquity of 
personal electronic devices with cameras, “[w]e live, relate, 
work, and decide in a world where image capture from life is 
routine, and captured images are part of ongoing discourse, 
both public and private.  Capture of images has become an 
                                              
2 Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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adjunct to memory and an accepted medium of connection 
and correspondence.”  Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image 
Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and 
the Right to Record, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 335, 337 (2011).  If 
we are to assess the issue from a reasonable officer 
perspective, we cannot artificially remove him or her from 
this widespread societal phenomenon.  (Indeed, it is not 
unreasonable to speculate that most—if not all—of the police 
officers themselves possessed such a personal electronic 
device at the time that the incidents underlying these cases 
took place.)  A reasonable police officer would have 
understood, first-hand, the significance of this proliferation of 
personal electronic devices that have integrated image capture 
into our daily lives, making it a routine aspect of the way in 
which people record and communicate events.  Apart from 
any court ruling or official directive, the officers’ own lived 
experience with personal electronic devices (both from the 
perspective of being the one who is recording and one who is 
being recorded) makes it unreasonable to assume that the 
police officers were oblivious to the First Amendment 
implications of any attempt by them to curtail such 
recordings. 
 
 As I noted above, I concur with the majority’s analysis 
and conclusions regarding the existence of a First 
Amendment right to record, and agree that the case against 
the City of Philadelphia should be remanded for further 
proceedings.  However, in light of the social, cultural, and 
legal context in which this case arose, I am convinced that—
in this unique circumstance—no reasonable officer could 
have denied at the time of the incidents underlying these 
cases that efforts to prevent people from recording their 
activities infringed rights guaranteed by the First 
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Amendment.  For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s 
conclusion that the police officers are immune from suit. 
